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Following the tragic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, local and national leaders 
responded to the security crisis by uniting the country under the American ideals of freedom and 
democracy while condemning the Islamic terrorist group responsible. With beliefs rooted in 
historical American and European prejudice, Western scholarship promoted a “clash of 
civilizations” between Islam and the West wherein the cultures’ supposed irreconcilable 
differences would inevitably lead to warfare. Simultaneously, many Americans grew suspicious 
of Muslims after the attacks, including government officials. As hate crimes against Muslim and 
Middle Eastern Americans soared in the U.S., government leaders used positive rhetoric to 
discourage violence and further unite the country’s citizens. At the same time, however, these 
leaders implemented discriminatory policy and law enforcement practices like the U.S. Patriot 
Act that disproportionately targeted Muslim immigrants and citizens from Muslim-majority 
countries in the name of counterterrorism. These Islamophobic sentiments and policies have only 
continued to grow under the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, with hate crimes and 
anti-Muslim sentiment once again skyrocketing in 2016. This powerful disconnect between 
governmental rhetoric and policy has allowed for decades-long discrimination against Muslim 












This thesis explores the contradiction within the American government between rhetoric and 
policy regarding Muslim and Middle Eastern communities as well as people perceived to be a 
member of either group. After the tragic terrorist attacks on 9/11, Islamophobic hate crimes 
soared across the U.S. To discourage this trend, Presidents Bush and Obama as well as local 
leaders like Mayors Giuliani and Bloomberg established positive, inclusive rhetoric about the 
religion of Islam. However, these same leaders instituted or oversaw discriminatory policy that 
specifically targeted the Muslim and Middle Eastern community for surveillance, tracking, and 
detention. With recent instability in the Middle East and renewed suspicion of Islam and its 
relation to terrorism, President Trump established cohesive and Islamophobic rhetoric and policy 
which continues to influence public opinion and widespread discrimination against Muslim 


















 On September 11, 2001, nearly three thousand people lost their lives in the deadliest 
terrorist attack on American soil. Perpetrated by the Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda based in 
Afghanistan, four commercial airplanes were hijacked. Two were flown into the North and South 
Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, instantly killing hundreds, setting the 
towers on fire, and causing the buildings to eventually collapse on trapped employees as well as 
police, fire, and rescue first responders. The third plane flew into the headquarters of the United 
States Department of Defense at the Pentagon, killing one hundred eighty-four people. The 
fourth plane, intended for the White House, was overtaken by passengers who crashed the 
aircraft in Pennsylvania, resulting in the death of all forty passengers.1 This attack was unlike 
anything the United States had ever experienced. Using civilians as targets, the 9/11 attacks saw 
more lives lost than the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. The smoldering rubble of the towers 
and posters for missing people buried in the debris remained in the heart of the country’s most 
populated city for months after the attacks and served as a daily reminder of the tragedy. Beyond 
the residents of New York City and Washington D.C. who witnessed the events firsthand, 
millions of people worldwide watched the attacks through television footage and news coverage. 
People across the country and around the world felt the overwhelming grief and terror that now 
plagued the United States.  
 
1 There are many sources detailing the tragic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 including: 
Noam Chomsky, 9/11: Was there an alternative? (Crawley, W.A.: University of Western  
Australia, 2011). 
Marc Redfield, The Rhetoric of Terror: Reflections on 9/11 and the War on Terror (New York, NY: Fordham 
University Press, 2009). 
David Holloway, 9/11 and the War on Terror (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008). 
Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington D.C.: National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 
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In response to this national tragedy, American patriotism soared as millions rallied in 
support of New York City and Washington D.C., donating blood for those who were injured and 
sending relief packages to the cities most affected. President George W. Bush’s approval rating 
skyrocketed from 55% to 90% in the days following 9/11, the highest figure ever recorded for a 
U.S. president. Likewise, Congress held the highest approval rating ever recorded at 84%, 
shattering the previous record of 57%.2 The victims of the attacks were viewed as martyrs for the 
American ideals of democracy and freedom, as many paid tribute to those lost with the haunting 
phrase, “Never Forget.” In President Bush’s Address to the Nation on September 11, 2001, the 
President asserted, “America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for 
freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining. Today, our 
nation saw evil – the very worst of human nature – and we responded with the best of America.”3 
When the United States government declared that al-Qaeda was responsible for the attacks, 
Americans responded by preparing themselves to fight the War on Terror against Islamic 
extremists.  
However, many people suffered from the ensuing widespread targeting of the Middle 
Eastern and Muslim communities in response to the terrorist attacks. Although political leaders 
like President George W. Bush, Attorney General John Ashcroft, the members of Congress, and 
New York Mayors Rudy Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg initially crafted positive rhetoric that 
distinguished Muslim citizens from terrorists, they simultaneously instituted discriminatory 
policy against Muslim and Arab civilians. Adhering to long held, dangerous Western 
 
2 David W. Moore, “Terrorism Most Important Problem, But Americans Remain Upbeat,” Gallup.com (Gallup, 
October 18, 2001), https://news.gallup.com/poll/4996/terrorism-most-important-problem-americans-remain-
upbeat.aspx. 
3 George W. Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation,” The White House: President George 




misconceptions about the Islamic theology and Middle East region, both local and national 
leaders enforced discriminatory surveillance and policing practices with the intent to specifically 
monitor Muslim citizens. Under tremendous pressure, fear, and grief, American leaders sought to 
protect the country by any means necessary, at the expense of Muslim, Arab, Southeast Asian, 
and Sikh civilians. Thus, the unique historical Western perception of Islam paired with the socio-
political context of fear cultivated a contradiction of governmental rhetoric condemning 
Islamophobia and the simultaneous institution of discriminatory policy against Arabs and 
Muslims. Although these prejudiced laws remain largely unchanged, presidential and local 
rhetoric today have transformed from peaceful and respectful to overwhelmingly negative and 
hateful. This transition has only aided in the steady rise of hate crimes against American 
Muslims since 9/11. Ultimately, the impending security crisis superseded the American 
government’s initial positive rhetoric and led to the implementation of Islamophobic policy 
which continues to negatively impact the American view of Islam today. 
Subsequently, as the country came together in an unprecedented display of national unity 
after 9/11, Muslim Americans became victims of widespread racial and religious profiling, 
government surveillance, and Islamophobic hate crimes. While still grappling with the 
devastating loss of the 9/11 attacks and the looming threat to U.S. security, all eyes were fixed on 
Islam. Hate crimes against Muslims, Arabs, and people perceived to be in either group 
skyrocketed in the U.S. as suspicion permeated throughout the country.4 While many 
government officials were careful to distinguish between extreme Muslim terrorist groups and 
the peaceful religion of Islam in their rhetoric, these same officials oversaw the implementation 
 
4 Ryan D. Byers; James A. Jones, "The Impact of the Terrorist Attacks of 9/11 on 




of policy that disproportionately affected Muslim and Arab citizens and dismantled their civil 
liberties. This rising animosity and distrust for the Muslim faith, called Islamophobia, has only 
continued to rise beyond the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Now, almost twenty years later, 
Islamophobic rhetoric and hate crimes have surpassed the 2001 level.5 
According to Mark Bleich, “Islamophobia can best be understood as indiscriminate 
negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims.”6 Unfortunately, many of the 
Islamophobic policies and hate crimes following 9/11 also targeted Middle Eastern people, 
specifically Arabs, because of the region’s association with Islam. Although the territory referred 
to in the term “Middle East” is often generalized and disputed, for the purpose of this essay, the 
definition of Middle East outlined by geopolitical scholar Karen Culcasi is used to reference the 
geographical areas of Afghanistan, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Sudan, Syria, Turkey, the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the various territories in Arabia 
including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates.7 
Because the American perspective groups Arab people and Muslim theology together, many 
Middle Eastern Christians, people of South Asian descent, Sikhs, and others that outwardly 
displayed racial or cultural similarities to the Americanized stereotype of Arabic Muslims 
became targets of Islamophobic discrimination and hate crimes despite not being members of the 
religion. For example, many cases of Islamophobic discrimination and harassment targeted 
women in hijabs and men in turbans, presumably because of the association between the 
 
5 Katayoun Kishi, “Assaults against Muslims in U.S. Surpass 2001 Level,” Pew Research Center (Pew Research 
Center, November 15, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/15/assaults-against-Muslims-in-u-s-
surpass-2001-level/. 
6 Erik Bleich, “Defining and Researching Islamophobia,” Review of Middle East Studies 46, no. ii (2012): pp. 180-
189, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41940895, 182. 
7 Karen Culcasi, “Constructing and Naturalizing the Middle East,” Geographical Review 100, no. 4 (October 2010): 
pp. 583-597, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25741178. 
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religious and regional garments with Islam and Arabia respectively.8 According to Ryan D. 
Byers and James A. Jones, there was a 1,600% surge in anti-Islamic hate crimes following 9/11 
when compared to the 2000 FBI data.9 Furthermore, 27.2% of all hate crimes in 2001 targeted 
Muslims, compared to only 0.035% in 2000.10 While this alarming trend diminished after the 
first eight weeks post-9/11, the frequency of hate crime perpetrated against Muslims never 
returned to its previous low level.11 It is important to note that these statistics only reflect FBI 
and police data when many Islamophobic crimes went and still go unreported. Moreover, these 
crimes range from vandalism, workplace discrimination, and harassment to violent assaults. In 
an extreme case, on September 15, 2001 in Mesa, Arizona, a Sikh man named Balbir Singh 
Sodhi was shot and killed by a man who had earlier told friends he was “going to go out and 
shoot some towel-heads.”12 Obviously a premeditated hate crime, the perpetrator had 
misidentified Sodhi as a Muslim because he was wearing a turban in accordance with his Sikh 
beliefs. It was also reported that the killer had shot at the home of an Afghan family and a store 
owned by a Lebanese man.13 In New York City, many taxi drivers were harassed and assaulted 
because of their ethnicity; numerous reports indicated that bystanders and law enforcement 
officials did not intervene or try to stop the incidents.14 
As these bias-induced crimes continue twenty years later, it is important to understand 
where the American, and by extension European, fear and distrust of Islam originates. Looking 
 
8 Human Rights Watch, “’WE ARE NOT THE ENEMY’: Hate Crimes Against Arabs, Muslims, and Those 
Perceived to be Arab or Muslim after September 11,” 14, no. 6 (G) (November 2002), 15. 
9 Byers and Jones, "The Impact of the Terrorist Attacks of 9/11,” 44. 
10 Ibid, 48. 
11 Ibid, 53. 
12 Anita Snow, “Correction: Sikh Killed-Anniversary Story,” AP News (Associated Press, September 15, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/article/f1fd15e5440c478d99472f18cc0e00a6. 
13 Ibid. 
14 “Civil Rights Implications of Post-September 11 Law Enforcement Practices in New York,” New York Advisory 
Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, New York, 2004, 8. 
Bilz 8 
 
at modern scholarly work that predates 9/11, much of the discourse surrounding Islamic history 
as well as Middle Eastern political relations with the United States demonstrates a simplistic 
view of Islam. Several scholars go so far as to pit ‘Western’ ideology against the Muslim religion 
to predict a “clash of civilizations” in which the seemingly incompatible views of Middle Eastern 
Muslims would violently oppose the U.S., thereby creating an “us” vs. “them” narrative within 
the United States and Western Europe.15 This concept of a “clash of civilizations” subscribes to 
the idea that war and conflict between Muslims and Americans is inevitable because of the 
irreconcilable differences in ideology, culture, and religion between the two groups. Of course, 
one obvious problem with this idea is that millions of Muslims currently reside in the United 
States, and millions more around the world support freedom, democracy, and the other ideals 
Americans hold sacred. Still, scholars like Bernard Lewis and Samuel P. Huntington describe 
Islam in direct opposition with the United States as innately separate and deeply divided entities. 
Specifically, in Bernard Lewis’s article “The Roots of Muslim Rage” first published in 
The Atlantic in 1990, the prominent scholar of Islam created a clear dichotomy between the 
United States and Islam as he speculated on the reason for longstanding U.S. tensions with the 
Middle East.16 He wrote, “But Islam, like other religions, has also known periods when it 
inspired in some of its followers a mood of hatred and violence. It is our misfortune that part, 
though by no means all or even most, of the Muslim world is now going through such a period, 
and that much, though again not all, of that hatred is directed against us.”17 Here, Lewis invoked 
a division between the United States and the Muslim world, even using “us” to refer to the 
United States. Although he was careful to not overly generalize about Muslims around the world, 
 
15 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York, NY: Touchstone, 
1996). 
16 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Policy 17, no. 4 (2001): pp. 17-26. 
17 Ibid, 17. 
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Lewis still used strong language and indicated a one-sided hatred directed at the U.S. from 
Muslims. He went on to say, “At times this hatred goes beyond hostility to specific interests or 
actions or policies or even countries and becomes a rejection of Western civilizations as such, 
not only what it does but what it is, and the principles and values that it practices and professes. 
These are indeed seen as innately evil, and those who promote or accept them as the ‘enemies of 
God.’”18 In this excerpt, Lewis set Western values against Muslim theology, making them seem 
inherently incompatible. More specifically, in discussing the U.S.’s relationship with Middle 
Eastern countries, Lewis stated that since the U.S. represented power, wealth, freedom, justice, 
opportunity, and success, “America had become the archenemy, the incarnation of evil, the 
diabolic opponent of all that is good, and specifically, for Muslims, of Islam.”19 Finally, Lewis 
coined the infamous phrase saying, “This is no less than a clash of civilizations – perhaps 
irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage . . 
.”20 As the predominant framework for viewing Middle Eastern and U.S. relations before 9/11, 
this divisive and reductive understanding of the Muslim belief system only fueled Islamophobic 
sentiment in the United States and divided the country against its Muslim citizens who 
eventually were perceived as outside enemies. Lewis was influential not only in theory but in 
policy as well; he served as an adviser on foreign policy and Middle Eastern relations to 
President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.21  
Of course, Lewis was not alone in this ideology. Famed political scientist Samuel P. 
Huntington posited similar ideas in his The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World 
 
18 Lewis, “Roots of Muslim Rage,” 18. 
19 Ibid, 19. 
20 Ibid, 26. 
21 Douglas Martin, “Bernard Lewis, Influential Scholar of Islam, Is Dead at 101,” The New York Times (The New 




Order. Meant to be a framework for viewing global relations and safeguarding against world 
war, Huntington separated the modern world into distinct civilizations with the West on one 
extreme end and Islam on the other.22 Like Lewis, Huntington placed Western beliefs in direct 
contrast to Islamic theology. In discussing the Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East beginning 
in the 1970s, Huntington stated, “The general failure of liberal democracy to take hold in Muslim 
societies is a continuing and repeated phenomenon for an entire century beginning in the late 
1800s. This failure has its source at least in part in the inhospitable nature of Islamic culture and 
society to Western liberal concepts.”23 Here, Huntington suggested that Muslim rejection of 
Western ideals like democracy is due to an inherent and irreconcilable difference between the 
two entities. Huntington argued this idea further saying, “Some Westerners, including President 
Bill Clinton, have argued that the West does not have problems with Islam but only with violent 
Islamist extremists. Fourteen hundred years of history demonstrate otherwise. The relations 
between Islam and Christianity, both Orthodox and Western, have often been stormy. Each has 
been the other’s Other.”24 Citing historic conflict between Muslims and Christians dating back to 
the Crusades, Huntington brings up a significant idea of “other.” With the clear dichotomy 
between West and East, Christian and Muslim drawn in Western scholarship, a contentious 
division of “us” vs. “them” emerges. Following 9/11, this idea of a stark and uncompromising 
division between Islam and the United States led to the “othering” of Muslim citizens and 
contributed to the resulting prejudiced policy and Islamophobic discrimination faced by millions 
of Muslim Americans. Huntington’s words also made a direct enemy of Islam as a religion, 
rather than the individuals that subscribe to fringe extreme interpretations of Islam who were 
 
22 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations. 
23 Ibid, 114. 
24 Ibid, 209. 
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responsible for terrorist attacks and other violent interactions with the U.S. This dangerous 
concept only aided in American resentment and misunderstanding of Islam. Reinforcing this 
idea, Huntington outright said, “The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic 
fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the 
superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.”25 Despite the 
innate similarities between Islam and Christianity as monotheistic religions that recognize the 
sanctity of Old Testament scripture and teachings, Huntington insisted that the Christian West 
was incompatible with Muslim countries in the East. 
These ideas of division expressed by Lewis and Huntington were reflected in the 
American public’s view of Islam in the years following 9/11. First, the majority of Americans 
agreed with the scholars’ proposed dichotomy of Muslim and Christian religious beliefs. For 
example, Princeton Survey Review Associates found that 60% of Americans in June 2003 
believed their religion was “very different” from Islam.26 Additionally, around 40% of 
Americans believed that the 9/11 terrorist attacks reflected the “true teachings of Islam” “to a 
great degree” or “to some degree” between September 2001 and June 2002, despite numerous 
Islamic associations and mosques condemning the attacks and terrorism altogether.27 Moreover, 
Lewis and Huntington’s statements regarding the perceived Islamic threat to Western civilization 
were echoed by the American public in various polls. The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 
reported that since 1994, over 33% of Americans viewed Islamic fundamentalism as a “critical 
threat” to U.S. interests with a significant spike to 61% in 2002.28 When asked if the Muslim 
 
25 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 217. 
26 Costas Panagopoulos, “Trends: Arab and Muslim Americans and Islam in the Aftermath of 9/11,” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 70, no. 4 (2006): pp. 608-624, 618. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid, 619. 
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world considers itself at war with the U.S., 71% of Americans answered “yes” in March 2002.29 
Finally over 70% of Americans polled by CBS believed it was likely that the war in Afghanistan 
would lead to a larger conflict between Western and Muslim countries.30 Clearly, Lewis and 
Huntington’s ideas about Western and Islamic division and inherent conflict was not limited to 
the academic sphere as a majority of Americans subscribed to the same belief system following 
9/11. 
While some Islamic scholars like Lewis and Huntington and the general American public 
focused on what they viewed as incompatible belief systems between Islam and the U.S., several 
academics criticized this argument for it its simplicity and reduction of Islam into a monolith. 
Instead, many chose to follow Edward Said’s argument in his work Orientalism against the 
predominant ideas in Western scholarship of Islam. Said defined the field of “Orientalism” as the 
study of the East by Western scholars who base their understanding on European ideas, 
preconceived notions, and the West’s relation to the East. More specifically he wrote, “The 
Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe’s greatest and richest and 
oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its 
deepest and most recurring images of the other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define 
Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.”31 Here, Said flipped 
Lewis and Huntington’s argument, saying that Europe has always set itself in contrast with 
Eastern society. Said went on to recognize how the prevailing, simplistic, and European-based 
ideas about the East have been spread saying: 
Orientalism, therefore, is not an airy European fantasy about the Orient but a created 
body of theory and practice in which, for many generations, there has been a considerable 
material investment. Continued investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge 
 
29 Panagopoulos, “Trends: Arab and Muslim Americans,” 620. 
30 Ibid, 621. 
31 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1978), 9-10. 
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about the Orient, an acceptable grid for filtering through the Orient into Western 
consciousness, just as the same investment multiplied – indeed made truly productive – 
the statements proliferating out from Orientalism into the general culture.32 
Prominent scholars, thinkers, and writers have perpetuated the idea of the Orient, therefore 
policy, behavior, and public opinion is rooted in the same ideology and rarely questioned. Again, 
Said reversed Huntington’s troubling argument that the Islamic world’s perceived animosity 
toward the U.S. stems from their feelings of superiority by writing the opposite, “Orientalism is 
never far from what Denys Hay has called the idea of Europe, a collective notion identifying ‘us’ 
Europeans as against all ‘those’ non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major 
component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and 
outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-
European peoples and cultures.”33 In this excerpt Said identified the European othering of the 
East and the resulting tension of European perceived superiority. Finally, Said recognized and 
worked to dispel the monolith of Islam that Lewis and Huntington readily engaged in saying, 
“Thus the history of Orientalism has both an internal consistency and a highly articulated set of 
relationships to the dominant culture surrounding it . . . there has never been such a thing as a 
pure, or unconditional, Orient.”34 In this way, Said criticized the simplistic, unitary Western view 
of Islam and acknowledged the complex and diverse reality of the “Orient.” 
 Furthermore, Edward Said wrote a scathing response to both Lewis and Huntington’s 
clash of civilizations model shortly after 9/11 in his article entitled, “The Clash of Ignorance.”35 
He criticizes, “Certainly neither Huntington nor Lewis has much time to spare for the internal 
dynamics and plurality of every civilization, or for the fact that the major contest in most modern 
 
32 Said, Orientalism, 14. 
33 Ibid, 15. 
34 Ibid, 30-1. 




cultures concerns the definition or interpretation of each culture, or for the unattractive 
possibility that a great deal of demagogy and downright ignorance is involved in presuming to 
speak for a whole religion or civilization.”36 Taking issue with the oversimplicity and 
generalizations that both scholars assert about the West and Islamic world as monolithic 
civilizations, Said points out the authors’ oversight of the plurality of both the West and Islam.  
 Most contemporary data support Said’s nuanced interpretation of Islam and disprove the 
stance of Lewis, Huntington, and the American public in their singular view of a complicated 
religion with diverse membership. For example, the pervading Western association of Muslims 
with the Middle East region, specifically Arab people, is inaccurate. In fact, according to the Pew 
Research Center, only 20% of the world’s Muslims live in the Middle East or North Africa, 
while 62% live in Asia or the Pacific Islands.37 Furthermore, Muslims around the world, like 
Christians and other religious groups, do not necessarily share the same religious interpretation 
or practices. For example, within Islam, there is a 1,400 year-old divide between Sunni and 
Shi’ite Muslims dating back to a dispute over Muslim leadership following the death of the 
prophet Muhammad.38 While practically all Muslims adhere to a belief in one God, the teachings 
of the prophet Muhammad, and the importance of religious rituals, e.g. fasting during the holy 
month of Ramadan, the global population is divided on the public adoption of sharia law, an 
Islamic legal code which will be discussed in further detail later.39 In relation to terrorism in the 
name of Islam, however, a vast majority of Muslims around the world denounce violence against 
civilians.40 For example, Pew Research Center characterized Muslim views of the terrorist group 
 
36 Said, “The Clash of Ignorance.” 
37 Michael Lipka, “Muslims and Islam: Key Findings in the U.S. and around the World,” Pew Research Center (Pew 







ISIS as “overwhelmingly negative.”41 Although the United States and Europe have perpetuated 
the idea of a singular Islamic belief system focused on hatred of the West and have narrowed the 
regional scope of Islam to the wide and diverse Middle East, Muslims around the world present 
differing beliefs and generally disagree with the terrorist acts committed by Islamic extremists. 
Moreover, within the United States specifically, the Muslim population is racially and 
ethnically diverse with varied commitment to the religion. Of Muslim immigrants living in the 
U.S. in 2017, 35% are South Asian, 25% are Middle Eastern or North African, and 23% are from 
the Asia-Pacific.42 While 41% of all U.S. Muslims are white (including people of Middle Eastern 
descent), 28% are Asian and 20% are Black.43 As for religious identification, 55% of U.S. 
Muslims are Sunni and 16% are Shi’ite, while the remaining 29% identify with neither group.44 
Pew also found that “Muslims in the U.S. are roughly as religious as U.S. Christians,”45 with 
varying degrees of devotion across the population. 82% of Muslims in the United States are 
American citizens, and 75% believe there is significant discrimination against Muslims in the 
United States, with 48% having experienced at least one incident of discrimination in the year 
2016.46 Still, despite the pervading stereotypes and disproportional number of hate crimes 
directed at members of the Islamic faith that have persisted since 9/11, 92% of U.S. Muslims 
answered that they are proud to be American.47 
 
41 Lipka, “Muslims and Islam.”. 
42 “Demographic Portrait of Muslim Americans,” Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project (Pew 
Research Center, July 26, 2017), https://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/demographic-portrait-of-Muslim-
americans/. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Lipka, “Muslims and Islam.” 
45 Ibid. 




Although the Westernized monolith of Islam and its association with the Middle East is 
unfounded in data, both the American public and government adhered to these ideas following 
9/11. Even though many government officials like President Bush and members of the U.S. 
Congress attempted to alleviate tension between the American public and Muslim citizens with 
calls for religious tolerance, the United States government simultaneously enacted law 
enforcement policy and created legislation throughout the past two decades that target Muslim 
and Arab Americans. Imbued with this skewed Westernized perception of Islam, the American 
public as well as government officials succumbed to prejudice and discrimination against a 
religion and region the nation has struggled to understand for centuries. 
Local 
On a local level, the New York City governmental response to the September 11 terrorist 
attacks balanced antidiscrimination remarks with inflammatory policy. Mayor Rudy Giuliani 
simultaneously praised New York’s Muslim and Arab communities at public events while 
allowing the New York Police Department (NYPD) to establish a covert intelligence unit that 
promoted spying on Muslim neighborhoods and mosques.48 Similarly, Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg touted diversity initiatives and his relationships with prominent Muslims in the 
community during his time as mayor and even signed an NYPD antidiscrimination bill, all the 
while establishing and overseeing the police department’s domestic surveillance units that 
racially and religiously targeted Arabs and Muslims.49   
 
48 Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, “With CIA Help, NYPD Moves Covertly in Muslim Areas,” NBC New York 
(Associated Press, August 24, 2011), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/with-cia-help-nypd-moves-covertly-
in-Muslim-areas/1926933/. 
49 Eileen Sullivan, “AP IMPACT: NYPD Spied on City’s Muslim Anti-Terror Partners and Allies of Mayor 




On October 1, 2001, just a few weeks after the World Trade Center collapsed, Mayor 
Giuliani addressed the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Terrorism. In his 
speech, Giuliani spoke to the strength and resilience of New York while urging for UN action 
against the terrorist group responsible for the attack. He was also careful to acknowledge the 
large population of Muslims and Arabs living in New York. He stated, “We have very strong and 
vibrant Muslim and Arab communities in New York City. They are an equally important part of 
the life of our city. We respect their religious beliefs.”50 Here, Giuliani recognized the 
contribution of Muslims to the city, distinguishing between the radical religion practiced by al-
Qaeda and the traditionally peaceful Islamic faith practiced by millions of Muslims in the United 
States and abroad. Furthermore, Mayor Giuliani referred to the racial and religious 
discrimination Muslim and Arab citizens faced in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 by saying, 
“I’ve urged New Yorkers not to engage in any form of group blame or group hatred.”51 Again 
Giuliani distinguishes between Muslims as a religious group, Arabs as people descending from a 
region in the Middle East, and the Muslim Arab terrorists. In his words, the mayor does not put 
blame on Arab or Muslim communities simply because of their vague group associations. 
Finally, in the conclusion of his speech, Rudy Giuliani dispels the idea of inevitable violence 
between conflicting Eastern and Western belief systems by saying, “Surrounded by friends of 
every faith, we know this is not a clash of civilizations.”52 Significantly, Giuliani used the phrase 
first put forth by Bernard Lewis in “The Roots of Muslim Rage” at the same time it was gaining 
traction around the world as reasoning behind the terrorist attacks. As Giuliani addressed 189 
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countries in the General Assembly of the United Nations, including 56 member nations in the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation,53 and 21 member nations in the League of Arab States,54 
which together contain 46 Muslim majority countries, he emphasized that cultural differences do 
not necessarily constitute warfare between Islamic and Christian societies or Western and 
Eastern regions. Giuliani’s address to the UN contained careful, precise language to ensure that 
blame not be placed on peaceful Muslims and Arabs for the terrorist attacks and to maintain 
goodwill among the members of the General Assembly.  
After Mayor Giuliani’s term ended, Michael Bloomberg was inaugurated New York 
City’s 108th mayor on January 1, 2002, just three and a half months after 9/11.55 Like his 
predecessor, Mayor Bloomberg constructed a careful public image as an ally of the Muslim 
community. For example, in July 2004, Bloomberg signed a law prohibiting the NYPD from 
engaging in racial profiling. In his public address at the signing ceremony, Mayor Bloomberg 
stated, “Racial profiling will not be tolerated in our city . . . New York City is home to eight 
million people of every race, ethnicity, and religion from all over the world.”56 Here, Bloomberg 
attempted to go beyond former Mayor Giuliani’s rhetoric and instituted policy to protect not only 
Muslims and Arabs, but all minority citizens in New York. However, legal experts have 
criticized the law, citing vague, unenforceable language. The law provides the definition of 
police racial profiling as follows: “an act of a member of the force of the police department or 
other law enforcement officer that relies on race, ethnicity, religion or national origin as the 
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determinative factor in initiating law enforcement action against an individual, rather than an 
individual's behavior or other information or circumstances that links a person or persons of a 
particular race, ethnicity, religion or national origin to suspected unlawful activity.”57 Critics of 
this definition say it is too vague and accuse the policy of not establishing consequences for 
violations of the law. However, on the surface, the law appears to correct unjust and 
discriminatory policing in New York City. Like Giuliani before him, Mayor Bloomberg reached 
out to Arab and Muslim communities in New York City and tried to unify the city against the 
backdrop of hate crimes targeting Muslims across the country. 
Although Mayor Rudy Giuliani and his successor Mayor Michael Bloomberg made 
positive remarks about the diversity of New York and the value of Muslim and Arab 
contributions to the city through their respective public addresses to the community, the two 
mayors oversaw the implementation of specialized NYPD intelligence units that specifically 
targeted Muslim and Arab New Yorkers. The NYPD discrimination story was broken by the 
Associated Press with a series of articles written from August through December of 2011 which 
earned authors Matt Apuzzo, Adam Goldman, Eileen Sullivan, and Chris Hawley the 2012 
Pulitzer Prize in Investigative Reporting.58 In their second article published August 24, 2011, 
Apuzzo and Goldman state, “A months-long investigation by The Associated Press has revealed 
that the NYPD operates far outside its borders and targets ethnic communities in ways that 
would run afoul of civil liberties rules if practiced by the federal government. And it does so with 
unprecedented help from the CIA in a partnership that has blurred the bright line between foreign 
and domestic spying.”59 This accusation is grounded in investigative work and interviews with 
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over forty current and former NYPD and federal officials, many of whom were directly involved 
in establishing and performing the surveillance. The reports uncovered decade-long NYPD 
procedure that included sending undercover officers into Muslim and Arab communities without 
indication of criminal behavior and writing detailed surveillance logs of Muslims and Arabs 
living in New York, all of which began under the mayoral tenure of Rudy Giuliani even before 
the World Trade Center fell on September 11, 2001.60 
The NYPD’s official surveillance operation began with the hiring of the department’s 
first civilian intelligence chief David Cohen in January 2002.61 Cohen had previously served in 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for thirty-five years.62 Since a 1985 lawsuit ruled that the 
NYPD must have “specific information” of criminal activity to warrant surveillance, the 
department was limited in how they could legally monitor citizens in order to prevent terrorism. 
In September 2002, Cohen asked the court to amend the regulation saying it made detecting 
terrorist plots “virtually impossible” and argued that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
had changed its procedure in response to the 9/11 attacks and the NYPD should be granted the 
same leniency.63 He wrote, “In the case of terrorism, to wait for an indication of crime before 
investigating is to wait far too long.”64 U.S. District Judge Charles S. Haight Jr. agreed, citing a 
new judiciary context and public safety concern. In turn, Cohen committed the department to 
following FBI investigative guidelines.  
With these looser regulations, Cohen transformed the NYPD’s intelligence unit. Using 
census data, undercover officers called “rakers” were employed in ethnic neighborhoods and told 
 







to observe the people, businesses, and area around them. Known as the Demographic Unit, this 
operation was undisclosed by the NYPD and only became public knowledge upon the release of 
the Associated Press series in 2012. “Rakers” monitored different areas in predominantly 
Muslim and Arab communities for indicators of radicalization or terrorism. They focused on a 
list of twenty-eight countries as “ancestries of interest” – almost all of which have strong ties to 
Islam.65 When pressed for comment by the Associated Press, the NYPD spokesman Paul Browne 
denied the existence of the unit and instead referred to the Zone Assessment Unit assigned to 
areas deemed susceptible to terrorist sympathies, but Browne insisted the police department only 
followed leads and did not spy on the neighborhoods without specific cause.66 However, 
testimony from a Bangladeshi New York police officer in a 2006 trial that convicted a man for 
plotting a terrorist attack revealed that officers were instructed to “act like a civilian – hang out 
in the neighborhood, gather information.”67 Following police protocol after 9/11, NYPD officers 
mapped out ethnic neighborhoods and collected information on people based solely on their 
perceived race, ethnicity, and religion. It is worth noting that similar surveillance programs 
targeting Muslim communities have been enacted in the United Kingdom since the creation of 
the CONTEST counter-terrorism program in early 2003.68 For example, in the Prevent phase of 
the strategy, U.K. policing and military authorities continue to infiltrate Muslim communities, 
obtain information, and analyze susceptibility to terrorist sympathies through publicly funded 
events and organizations targeting mosques and youth groups.69 These examples of domestic 
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surveillance of Muslim and Arab communities perpetrated by the United States and the United 
Kingdom demonstrate a broad Western suspicion of Islam after 9/11.  
In addition, the NYPD developed a Terrorist Interdiction Unit to find and handle 
informants. Interviews with officers and police documents showed that Cohen stationed a 
disproportionate number of officers in a Pakistani neighborhood and instructed them to find a 
reason to stop cars, i.e. speeding, running stop signs, broken tail lights, etc. to give the officers 
the opportunity to search for outstanding warrants or suspicious behavior. Once in police 
custody, the officers would then leverage the arrest to obtain new informants in Muslim 
neighborhoods. In other instances, informants were recruited from Muslim prisoners who were 
promised better conditions and money upon release if they provided information to the police. 
One extreme example of informant recruitment occurred when the NYPD asked the city’s taxi 
commission to run a report on all Pakistani cab drivers for fraudulent license to pressure them to 
become informants. Called “mosque crawlers” in interviews, these civilian informants attended 
services at mosques across the city and reported church activity including information about 
imams and attendees to police. Again, the NYPD spokesman denied using mosque crawlers, 
despite testimony from a police informant in court saying that “he attended hundreds of prayer 
services and collected information even on people who showed no signs of radicalization.”70 
Despite protection from the first amendment, Muslims were monitored in their place of worship 
by the NYPD through heavily recruited mosque crawlers. 
Apuzzo and Goldman also reported on NYPD activity outside of New York City. Some 
officers were appointed as federal marshals so they could work outside of city limits. An 
undercover squad of NYPD officers known as the Special Services Unit operated in New Jersey, 
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Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts although they could not make arrests outside New York 
jurisdiction.71 Other NYPD officers had been stationed in eleven foreign cities.72 Moreover, in 
August 2003, local police were given permission by the federal government to enforce 
immigration law, which had previously been treated as civil rather than criminal law.73 Many of 
members of the NYPD were granted federal privileges and security clearance, effectively 
blurring the line between federal and local law enforcement.74 
With help from informants as well as undercover officers in New York and elsewhere, 
analysts within the department compiled a report on every mosque within one hundred miles of 
New York City to determine the likelihood of terrorist infiltration of a particular community. In 
total, the NYPD collected information on over two hundred fifty mosques, thirty-one Muslim 
student associations, and numerous community bookstores, restaurants, and other local 
businesses. Many were under surveillance for criminal activity, but others were monitored for 
little more than religious discrimination. For example, a Bangladeshi restaurant was identified as 
an area of interest because of its “devout crowd.”75 Observing customer religious affiliation and 
identifying a high level of devotion as a reason for suspicion was just one instance of the NYPD 
profiling Muslim citizens. Of the Islamic establishments monitored by officers, seven Muslim 
student associations were marked “MSAs of concern”76 while fifty-three mosques were labeled 
as “mosques of concern” for reasons varying from money laundering and radical teachings of 
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extreme Salafism to more vague concerns like “rhetoric.”77 For example, two mosques were 
identified for ties to a one-thousand-year-old Egyptian mosque called Al-Azhar, a prominent 
establishment among Sunni Muslims around the world and one of the first religious institutions 
to condemn the 9/11 terrorist attacks.78 In fact, President George W. Bush’s advisor Karen 
Hughes met with the head of the institution in 2005 during her tour of the Middle East which 
aimed to align the region with the United States against extremism.79 Al-Azhar also hosted 
President Obama in 2009 for his address uniting the Muslim world with the U.S.80 Despite its 
long established friendly relationship with the United States, mosques with ties to Al-Azhar were 
marked as potential terrorist threats to the nation for vague and unclear reasons. 
Furthermore, the diversity and friendship with Muslim leaders that Mayor Bloomberg 
emphasized in his mayoral tenure did not give the Islamic figures exemption from NYPD 
surveillance. The Associated Press reported that two mosques in Queens that had previously 
been monitored by the NYPD were promoted as “destination options” to emphasize the city’s 
diversity in a 2009 city planning brochure for a bike tour route.81 Although the NYPD under 
Bloomberg had been collecting information on these mosques, they were later deemed safe 
enough to tout as a political tokenization of New York’s “celebration” of diversity. Moreover, 
the mosques included in the undercover operations of the NYPD had been publicly visited by 
Mayor Bloomberg where he met with leaders he deemed allies in the fight against terrorism.82 As 
summarized by Eileen Sullivan of the Associated Press, “The dichotomy between simultaneously 
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being partner and suspect is common among some of New York’s Muslims.”83 Despite Mayor 
Bloomberg’s public allyship with Muslim leaders, he allowed NYPD officers to monitor their 
mosques without cause and infiltrate their communities with informants. 
Additionally, the NYPD monitored Muslims in the New York City area by tracking name 
changes. In 2008 the department requested official information regarding name changes from 
state court officials who claimed it was all public information and that they were unaware of how 
the police were using it.84 Despite a federal court order restricting background checks unless 
police had information suggesting criminal activity, the NYPD selected names to undergo 
background checks. Associated Press reporters found from police records that over 65% of the 
people investigated for name changes had Arabic sounding names, even though officers were 
allegedly told to include American sounding names so that the department could not be accused 
of profiling.85 All of the names were catalogued by NYPD for future use, even if the background 
checks were clear.86 This act is especially troubling, since in the aftermath of 9/11, many Muslim 
and Arab citizens decided to change their names to avoid the widespread discrimination and hate 
crimes being perpetrated against those perceived to be from either group. However, those 
Muslim and Arab citizens seeking refuge from discrimination were then investigated and logged 
by NYPD for having ethnic-sounding names in the first place.  
Although Mayors Giuliani and Bloomberg included positive and inclusive rhetoric about 
Arab and Muslim New Yorkers while simultaneously overseeing the New York Police 
Department institute discriminatory investigative and surveillance policies in the years 
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immediately following 9/11, they have both defended their policies as well as the actions of the 
NYPD in more recent years in a continued showing of hypocrisy. For example, at the Republican 
National Convention on July 18, 2016, Rudy Giuliani spoke carefully about 2016 terrorist 
attacks linked to Islamic extremism stating, “It is Islamic extremist terrorism. I did not say all of 
Islam. I said Islamic extremist terrorism. Failing to identify them properly maligns decent 
Muslims around the world.”87 Rhetorically speaking, Giuliani maintained a polished and 
thoughtful outlook on terrorism as it relates to Islam even fifteen years after the 9/11 attacks. 
However, Giuliani directly contrasted his rhetorical position the next night in an interview with 
the Intercept on July 19, 2016, where he claimed responsibility without remorse for overseeing 
the NYPD’s expanded discriminatory practices, going so far as to take credit for dismantling first 
amendment protections even earlier than the Associated Press initially reported. He said, “I was 
the mayor who put police officers in mosques, in New York and New Jersey. We did it for the 
eight years I was mayor. After the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center by Islamic extremist 
terrorists from New Jersey, I did it in early January of 1994.”88 Despite his remarks in 2001 
asserting that he “respected their religious beliefs,” Giuliani demonstrated little reverence for 
Muslims or first amendment protections in the Constitution as practicing Muslims worshipped 
alongside undercover police officers citywide during his tenure as mayor. 
Similarly, former Mayor Bloomberg has defended the NYPD’s surveillance techniques 
following 9/11 under his administration. In an interview on John Gambling’s radio show on 
WOR radio in 2012, Bloomberg said, “Everything the NYPD has done is legal, it is appropriate, 
it is constitutional. They are permitted to travel beyond the border of New York City to 
 






investigate cases . . . We don’t target individuals based on race or religion. We follow leads.”89 
Like the NYPD spokesman, Bloomberg stuck to the argument that NYPD “followed leads” and 
did not “target individuals based on race or religion” despite overwhelming evidence that the 
department aggressively monitored Muslim and Arab neighborhoods and investigated several 
mosques solely for their religious affiliations. Once again Mayor Bloomberg defended his and 
the NYPD’s response to 9/11 during his 2020 presidential campaign. In an interview with PBS 
NewsHour on February 13, 2020, Bloomberg explained:  
We sent some officers into some mosques to listen to the sermon that the imam gave. We 
were very careful. And the authorities that looked at us said, yes you complied with the 
law. But we had every intention of going every place we could legally to get as much 
information to protect this country. We had just lost 3,000 people at 9/11. Of course 
we’re supposed to do that. There were some imams who publicly at that time were urging 
terrorism. And so of course that’s where you gonna [sic] go. That does not, incidentally 
mean that all Muslims are terrorists or all terrorists are Muslims. But the people who flew 
those airplanes came from the Middle East.90 
Here, like Giuliani, Bloomberg is careful to distinguish between Muslims and terrorists despite 
the NYPD policies that did not grant the same distinctions. Additionally, since the city of New 
York has settled several lawsuits over NYPD surveillance of Muslim and Arab citizens resulting 
in the removal of certain information gathered by the intelligence unit,91 the legality of NYPD 
policy remains murky at best although the city and its police department have never admitted to 
violating any law or any wrongdoing as it pertains to their intelligence unit.  
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While the ethics and constitutionality of NYPD procedure post-9/11 has proven 
controversial, Mayor Bloomberg spoke to an essential point in this interview. New York City 
lost three thousand people in a single morning. The 9/11 terrorist attacks left a brutal scar on the 
country, particularly in New York City. According to the University of Connecticut Center for 
Survey Research and Analysis, around 40% of Americans in 2002 and 2003 believed that the 
government should have the power to monitor Muslims.92 Like the NYPD, many Americans 
agreed with police departments’ policies of sweeping, targeted surveillance of Muslims in 
response to the attacks on September 11, 2001. Although by 2012 NYPD officers and 
community members could acknowledge the hypocrisy and discrimination taking place in public 
institutions in New York City, they were still a grieving and terrified city for over a decade after 
the attacks. Demonstrated through the actions of their mayors, New York, and by extension the 
rest of the United States, was overwhelmingly in support of protection and security from 
terrorism even at the cost of civil liberties. Although they superficially praised the diversity of 
their city, New Yorkers embraced any policy to counter terrorism, even those that threatened the 
freedom of their community. On a local level and at the heart of the devastating loss on 9/11, 
New York responded to the 9/11 attacks with positive rhetoric through its mayoral addresses but 
prejudiced policy under its police department.  
National 
 The hypocrisy of local government establishing Islamophobic policy with positive 
language toward Muslims post-9/11 is also reflected on the national level. In 2001, members of 
Congress, the President, and the Attorney General of the United States condemned hate crimes 
and discrimination against Muslim and Middle Eastern Americans within the very legislation 
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that targeted the groups. From the controversial Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (U.S.A 
Patriot Act) to FBI training and counterterrorism procedure, federal officials created, approved, 
and enacted harmful, discriminatory policy under the guise of national security while publicly 
denouncing Islamophobia after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.    
 First, one of the most egregious and widely criticized policies instituted after 9/11, the 
Patriot Act allowed federal law enforcement less restrictions on conducting surveillance, 
obtaining warrants, and detaining suspects of terrorist activity.93 Hastily passed by the Senate 
and House of Representatives and signed by President Bush just forty-five days after 9/11, the 
act received overwhelming support in both chambers of Congress with a single vote against it in 
the Senate.94 Although the Patriot Act resulted in largescale discrimination against U.S. Muslims, 
the law ironically begins with a broad condemnation of prejudice against Arab and Muslim 
Americans.95 Section 102 of the law reiterates the Constitutional rights of “Arab Americans, 
Muslim Americans, and Americans from South Asia,” praises many Muslims as national heroes 
in the midst of the terrorist attacks, and unequivocally denounces the acts of violence targeting 
these groups and “those who are, or perceived to be, of Arab or Muslim decent” in the wake of 
9/11.96 The section concludes that the “civil rights and civil liberties of all Americans, including 
Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and Americans from South Asia, must be protected and 
that every effort must be taken to preserve their safety.”97 Despite the efforts of the bill authors to 
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invoke a sense of inclusion with Muslim citizens, the passing of the Patriot Act has led to 
heightened suspicion of Islamic religious practices and the widespread violation of Muslim and 
Middle Eastern Americans’ civil liberties.98 As stated by Islamic scholar Geneive Abdo, “The 
act, written in response to the September 11 attacks, in theory applies to all citizens, but it was 
written with Muslims in mind and in practice denies them their civil liberties by empowering law 
enforcement authorities to raid their homes, offices, and mosques in the name of the war on 
terrorism.”99 Organizations like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Americans 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) as well 
as Middle East and legal scholars have criticized the Patriot Act for the broad authority granted 
to federal law enforcement in preventing terrorism and its disproportionate effect on those 
perceived to be Muslim or Middle Eastern.100 According to CAIR, 42% of complaints filed to the 
organization by Muslims after 9/11 were the result of profiling at the hands of federal law 
enforcement like the FBI and various agents with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
as well as Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officials at airports.101 Before the 
passing of the Patriot Act, the organization received few complaints from Muslims regarding 
mistreatment based on ethnic or religious profiling.102 Moreover, the complaints filed in wake of 
the Patriot Act included “not only security-centered scrutiny but also public humiliation, raids by 
government agents on Muslim homes and businesses, detention and interrogation of Muslims, as 
 
98 Kam C. Wong, “The U.S.A Patriot Act: A Policy of Alienation,” Michigan Journal of Race and Law 12 (2006): 
pp. 161-202. 
99 Geneive Abdo, “Islam in America: Separate but Unequal,” The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 4 (2005): pp. 7-17, 
12. 







well as closure of several Muslim charities.”103 One instance of religious discrimination occurred 
in New Jersey’s Bernards Township when the Planning Board blocked the construction of a 
mosque citing zoning issues that applied to mosques but not synagogues or Christian churches 
since Muslim services were predominantly on Fridays.104 The Department of Justice later 
uncovered emails between board members filled with Islamophobic ideas.105 For instance, one 
member wrote, “As a religion, Islam owes its size and influence to a tradition from Day 1 of 
forced conversions through violent means.”106 Subscribing to an unfounded and outdated view of 
Islam’s largely peaceful spread, this New Jersey township showcased the worst of backward 
Western ideology and the manipulation of policy to discriminate against Muslim communities. 
In the end, since terrorist threats were associated with the Middle East and Islamic religion, 
many innocent Muslims became suspects of terror to law enforcement and the American public 
at large, which in turn made Muslims the main victims of the Patriot Act’s suspension of civil 
liberties. 
 Like Congress, the U.S. Department of Justice issued statements denouncing 
Islamophobia and racial profiling while also instituting federal regulations that targeted 
nonimmigrants from predominantly Muslim countries. Published in 2003 after decades of “stop 
and frisk” and other racially motivated policies, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a “Fact 
Sheet” on racial profiling claiming to ban and abolish racial profiling in the American justice 
system.107 As stated by Attorney General John Ashcroft on February 28, 2002, “This 
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administration . . . has been opposed to racial profiling and has done more to indicate its 
opposition than ever in history. The President said it’s wrong and we’ll end it in America, and I 
subscribe to that. Using race . . . as a proxy for potential criminal behavior is unconstitutional, 
and it undermines law enforcement by undermining the confidence that people can have in law 
enforcement.”108 The DOJ also received guidance from the Civil Rights Division to effectively 
ban racial profiling in law enforcement activities, like during traffic stops and routine patrols.109 
However, the DOJ gives exception to terrorism cases saying, “Given the incalculably high stakes 
involved in such investigations, federal law enforcement officers who are protecting national 
security or preventing catastrophic events (as well as airport security screeners) may consider 
race, ethnicity, alienage, and other relevant factors.”110 Here, the DOJ strictly prohibits racial 
profiling while still leaving room for its officials to discriminate against Muslims in the context 
of terrorism and national security.  
 The hypocrisy continued into the Attorney General’s implementation of the National 
Security Entry/Exit Registration System (NSEERS).111 This program initiated exactly one year 
after the 9/11 attacks tracked nonimmigrants like students, temporary workers, and temporary 
residents living in the U.S. and required individuals from certain countries to be fingerprinted, 
photographed, and interviewed under oath at U.S. ports of entry.112 In conjunction with 
NSEERS, male nonimmigrants over 16 years old already living in the United States from 
countries determined by the Attorney General to be threats to national security were legally 
compelled to complete Call-In Special Registration at the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 
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Services (BCIS) under DHS.113 The countries included were Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, 
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Jordan, and Kuwait.114 With the exception of North Korea, Attorney General Ashcroft’s list 
specifically targeted Muslim majority countries predominantly in the Middle East.  
Moreover, the Call-In registration system was riddled with problems. First, 
nonimmigrants from the selected countries were only informed of the requirement through the 
Federal Register and later on the BCIS website,115 which meant this information was only 
available to people with internet access and the ability to read English.116 There was also a 
general lack of training and oversight, as many registrants faced inconsistent policy, procedure, 
and paperwork.117 Furthermore, BCIS did not provide interpreters as the director had previously 
promised, so many registrants relied on family members, friends, or strangers in the crowd to 
translate for them as they testified under oath; some were denied interpreters altogether if their 
English was deemed “good enough” by immigration officials.118 In addition, attorneys were not 
allowed to be with clients unless they were making a sworn statement, so many mistakenly 
waived their rights.119 Finally, many nonimmigrants were mistreated by BCIS officials. Some 
registrants were held in a cell and handcuffed for up to thirty-six hours.120 Through the 
registration process, officials learned of expired visas or immigration violations and detained 
many men for deportation, even though immigration services, appeals, and extensions were on 
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delay because of the NSEERS program taking up time and resources.121 For example, in Los 
Angeles, four hundred mostly Iranian men were detained for deportation even though many had 
already applied to live in the U.S. as permanent residents.122 As a result, many registrants feared 
deportation upon arrival at BCIS, but if they did not register, they still faced deportation for 
breaking the law.123  
Facing criticism for discriminatory practices, the DOJ defended NSEERS and Call-In 
Registration in the Federal Register. When presented with the argument that the rule was 
discriminatory, the DOJ responded, “contrary to what some commenters may believe, this 
method is not new.”124 They also published a section dedicated to recognizing the broad 
discrimination Muslim Americans were experiencing at the hand of the public but denied any 
wrongdoing or complicity.125 The section concludes, “The Department remains firmly committed 
to protecting the civil rights of all individuals in the United States while seeking to prevent acts 
of terrorism. The Department unequivocally rejects the notion that the requirements of the final 
rule, or the criteria for application of the final rule, to nonimmigrant aliens subject to special 
registration are, or are intended to be, invidiously discriminatory.”126 Despite this abject denial of 
guilt, the DOJ suspended special registration at the end of 2003 once all Call-In groups had 
already registered and their data had been collected.127 Ultimately, only 11 out of 85,000 
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registrants through NSEERS had ties to terrorism.128 From the special registration program 
nationwide, 13,799 nonimmigrants were placed in removal proceedings.129 While claiming to 
prohibit racial profiling in federal law enforcement and denying Islamophobic bias, the 
Department of Justice used ethnicity to monitor Muslims as suspects of terrorist activity 
throughout the country. 
In addition to immigration services targeting Muslims under the direction of the DOJ, 
federal law enforcement officers in the FBI implemented discriminatory surveillance practices 
and issued Islamophobic training materials.130 Like the NYPD, FBI Director Robert Mueller 
ordered fifty-six field offices to develop “demographic” profiles of their region which would be 
used to “set specific numerical goals for counter terrorism investigations and secret national 
security wiretaps in each region.”131 These profiles included the number of mosques in the area 
categorized under a section marked “Vulnerability.”132 Furthermore, a 2006 FBI intelligence 
report described Islamic converts as “Homegrown Islamic Extremists” if they were “wearing 
traditional Muslim attire,” “growing facial hair,” “frequently attended mosque or prayer group,” 
“travelling to a Muslim country,” or had “increased activity in a pro-Muslim social group or 
political cause.”133 In labeling these religious institutions and practices as areas of suspicion for 
terrorist activities, the FBI employed blatant religious profiling against Muslims.  
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Similarly, the FBI provided optional briefings for its agents on the tenets and belief 
system of Islam that contained a slew of Quranic misinterpretations and stereotypes with the 
purpose of “identifying the elements of verbal deception in Islam and their impacts on law 
enforcement.”134 Here, the FBI does not distinguish between Islam, Islamic extremism, or 
terrorism. In training, agents are seemingly taught the terms are synonymous. Many of these 
briefings on Islam were written by FBI intelligence analyst William Gawthrop, who was quoted 
in 2006 prior to his position in the Bureau saying, “Muhammad’s mindset is a source for 
terror.”135 In one presentation entitled “Militancy Considerations,” Gawthrop graphed 
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam from 1400 B.C. to 2010 over a range of “violent” to 
“nonviolent.”136 According to the graph, Christians and Jews became increasingly nonviolent 
over time, while Muslims flatlined at a violent level around 620 A.D. continuing until 2010.137 In 
another briefing on Islamic Law, the presentation described the prophet “Mohammad” as a “Cult 
Leader for small inner circle,”138 and defined the Islamic practice of almsgiving, zakat, as a 
“warfare funding mechanism,” going so far to say that for Muslims, “expenditure of zakat on 
warfighting is not only permissible but obligatory.”139 These presentations also exhibited 
ideology that subscribed to the inevitable “clash of civilizations” that Orientalist scholars and 
policy advisors predicted in the late 1990s. For example, one briefing stated, “There can be no 
peace between the two [Islam and nonbelievers] until dar al Islam conquers and assimilates its 
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adversary.”140 Again, Gawthrop reiterates, “Accommodation and compromise are impermissible 
and fighting is obligatory . . . War is the rule and peace is only temporary.”141 Gawthrop’s 
understanding of Islam is similar to that of Huntington and Lewis as he agrees that Islam and 
Western culture are inherently opposed, incompatible, and perpetually engaged in conflict with 
one another. Perhaps most troubling about these briefings, Gawthrop intentionally groups 
mainstream Islam with Islamic extremism and terrorism saying, “There may not be a radical 
threat as much as it is simply a normal assertion of the orthodox ideology . . . The strategic 
themes animating these Islamic values are not fringe; they are main stream [sic].”142 Implying 
that Islam mandates warfare with the West and that all practicing Muslims support terrorist 
ideology, these FBI briefings display an uninformed, biased, and discriminatory mindset that 
wrongfully placed an air of suspicion and distrust on the Muslim community from law 
enforcement officials. Although the briefings each begin with the disclaimer that the beliefs 
expressed in the presentations may not be that of the government or FBI, these materials were 
still presented at Quantico to agents in the field combating terrorism across the country.143  
Despite appointing an Attorney General that oversaw these discriminatory practices, 
President George W. Bush used positive rhetoric to try to dispel the Islamophobia sweeping over 
the nation. Following the 9/11 attacks, most of the country looked to the President to lead and 
protect the country at the cusp of the greatest and most tangible threat to national security the 
country had seen since War World II. Just nine months into his first term, President Bush faced 
critical decisions that would affect domestic and foreign relations for decades to come. In 
practice, President Bush started two foreign wars with Muslim countries in response to 9/11 
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while enacting domestic security measures that disproportionately affected members of the 
Islamic faith and people of Arab descent by signing the Patriot Act. However, while speaking 
authoritatively and aggressively to the terrorist group responsible, President Bush maintained a 
positive view of Islam in his speeches, encouraging compassion and peace among panicked 
American citizens.  
Notably, President Bush worked to dispel misconceptions and stereotypes about the 
Muslim faith in most of his speeches following 9/11. With the largest platform in American 
government, he used his rhetorical influence to promote understanding and unity among all faiths 
and nationalities while actively combatting Islamophobia within the United States. In several 
speeches to the American people and governmental entities, President George W. Bush 
distinguished Muslims from terrorists by emphasizing the peaceful foundation of the Islamic 
faith, included Muslims and Arabs in the national context of grief and healing, and condemned 
Islamophobic hate crimes. 
First, President Bush separated Islam from the faith practiced by radical terrorists. In a 
speech to Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush said of al-Qaida’s relationship to 
Islam, “The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by 
Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics; a fringe movement that perverts the 
peaceful teachings of Islam.”144 Later in the same speech, President Bush addressed Muslims and 
acknowledged that their faith was being corrupted and misinterpreted by terrorist groups. He 
stated: 
I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your 
faith. It's practiced freely by many millions of Americans and by millions more in 
 
 
144 George W. Bush, “Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress,” Selected Speeches of President George 




countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those 
who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are 
traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America 
is not our many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical 
network of terrorists and every government that supports them.145 
At a time when hate crimes against Muslims were spiking to unprecedented levels in the United 
States, President Bush recognized the peaceful tenets of Islam as well as the United States’ 
Muslim and Arab allies in fighting against terrorism. Again the president separated the two 
entities in his remarks at the Department of Defense Service of Remembrance at the Pentagon on 
October 11, 2001. To a domestic audience, he asserted, “For us too, in the year 2001, an enemy 
has emerged that rejects every limit of law, morality, and religion. The terrorists have no true 
home in any country, or culture, or faith.”146 In denying the terrorists a home in the Middle East 
and foundations in the Islamic faith, President Bush made a key distinction to discourage hatred 
and blame on all Muslim and Arab people. He restated this idea on an international stage at the 
UN General Assembly saying, “The terrorists are increasingly isolated by their own hatred and 
extremism. They cannot hide behind Islam. The authors of mass murder and their allies have no 
place in any culture, and no home in any faith.”147 The president then emphasized the specific 
disconnect between Muslim teachings and the religion practiced by terrorists adding:  
Last week, the Sheikh of Al-Azhar University, the world’s oldest Islamic institution of 
higher learning, declared that terrorism is a disease, and that Islam prohibits killing 
innocent civilians. The terrorists call their cause holy, yet, they fund it with drug dealing; 
they encourage murder and suicide in the name of a great faith that forbids both. They 
dare to ask God’s blessing as they set out to kill innocent men, women and children. But 
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the God of Isaac and Ishmael would never answer such a prayer. And a murderer is not a 
martyr; he is just a murderer.148 
In using Islamic scholarship and teaching, President Bush worked consistently and carefully to 
dispel false association of peaceful practicing Muslims worldwide with the extremism of 
terrorists. In fact, numerous Muslim scholars, leaders, and organizations outright condemned the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, including but not limited to the League of Arab States, the Secretary 
General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and various Islamic leaders and 
politicians from Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Palestine, and Tunisia.149 
 Moreover, President Bush included Muslims and Arabs in his rhetoric as American 
heroes, sympathizers, and grieving family members instead of solely associating them in the 
context of terrorism. Here, he worked to dispel the monolith that has followed Islam for centuries 
and provide a place in the nation for grieving Muslims, sharing the same fears and devastation of 
every American citizen following the attacks. For example, he spoke of good deeds in response 
to the terrorist attacks and international showing of support declaring, “We’ve seen the unfurling 
of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers in English, Hebrew, 
and Arabic . . . We will not forget South Korean children gathering to pray outside our embassy 
in Seoul, or the prayers of sympathy offered at a mosque in Cairo.”150 Including mentions of 
Arabic and Muslim support, President Bush displayed Muslims and Arabs in the context of 
global allyship. Furthermore, the president acknowledged that Muslim and Arab people had been 
victims of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and had also acted heroically like thousands of other 
Americans. In his Address to the United Nations, he said of the list of lives lost, “Those names 
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include a young Pakistani who prayed toward Mecca five times a day, and died that day trying to 
save others . . . All of the victims, including Muslims, were killed with equal indifference and 
equal satisfaction by the terrorist leaders. The terrorists are violating the tenets of every religion, 
including the one they invoke.”151 Here, President Bush worked to connect Muslims and Arabs 
to the unity and heroic patriotism many felt in the wake of 9/11 from which Muslims and Arabs 
had been previously excluded. 
 Finally, in these speeches given within the first few months of 9/11, President Bush 
unequivocally condemned the surging hate crimes against Muslims across the country. In the 
address to Congress, President Bush asserted, “We’re in a fight for our principles, and our first 
responsibility is to live by them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind 
words because of their ethnic background or religious faith.”152 Later, at the UN he stated, “To 
inflame ethnic hatred is to advance the cause of terror . . . The war against terror must not serve 
as an excuse to persecute ethnic and religious minorities in any country. Innocent people must be 
allowed to live their own lives, by their own customs, under their own religion.”153 With these 
words, President Bush made an international statement with pressing domestic implications that 
religious and racial discrimination is unethical and wrongfully placed on these groups. 
Of course, President Bush’s most famous address on Islam at the Islamic Center of 
Washington D.C. on September 17, 2001 combined each of the previously outlined rhetorical 
elements with the aim to create a safer, more positive space for Muslims and Arabs in the U.S. 
Delivered less than a week after the terrorist attacks, the speech included verses from the Quran 
encouraging peace, an emphasis on Muslim allyship against terrorism, and a clear condemnation 
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of Islamophobic hate crimes by the President of the United States. Immediately, he separated 
terrorism from the Muslim faith saying, “These acts of violence against innocents violate the 
fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith. And it’s important for my fellow Americans to 
understand that.”154 To further demonstrate this point, President Bush asserted, “The face of 
terror is not the true faith of Islam. That’s not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These 
terrorists don’t represent peace.”155 Finally, the president condemned Islamophobic hate crimes 
stating, “Those who feel like they can intimidate our fellow citizens to take out their anger don’t 
represent the best of America, they represent the worst of humankind, and they should be 
ashamed of that kind of behavior.”156 In a significant gesture, President Bush delivered this 
tolerant speech encouraging compassion and quoting the Muslim holy book on the steps of the 
Islamic Center in Washington D.C. just six days after the terrorist attacks, providing a key 
rhetorical example to all American citizens. 
President Bush and Mayors Giuliani and Bloomberg ultimately inspired religious 
tolerance in the American people in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 through their careful, 
inclusive rhetoric. Surprisingly, public opinion polls conducted in the first few months following 
9/11 showed Americans’ attitudes toward Islam were mostly positive.157 These more favorable 
views were perhaps the result of increasingly positive rhetoric from government officials 
encouraging religious tolerance, such as President Bush’s speech at the Islamic Center of 
Washington D.C.158 For example, a poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates 
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found that from March to November 2001, the proportion of Americans with a “very favorable” 
or “mostly favorable” view of Islam increased from 45% to 59%, with “very favorable” numbers 
more than doubling.159 Additionally, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 
reported in July 2002 that 79% of Muslim Americans said they had experienced “an act of 
kindness or support from friends or colleagues of other faiths” after 9/11.160  Following the lead 
of President Bush, Americans reported higher tolerance and understanding of Islam in the first 
weeks and months after the attacks. But while Americans reported having more favorable views 
of Islam in the immediate wake of 9/11, the hate crime statistics show the inverse to be true. 
Most Islamophobic incidents were reported within the first few weeks of the attacks, yet public 
opinion surveys recorded positive attitudes toward Muslims. Again following the example of 
President Bush, Americans appeared more tolerant in their rhetoric regarding Muslims and 
Arabs, but the spiking hate crimes in the first weeks following 9/11 suggest their actions were 
not so tolerant. Just as the President appeared more tolerant in his rhetoric while simultaneously 
approving discriminatory legislation, the American public instigated hate crimes while reporting 
more favorable views of Islam. 
Moreover, this reported positive view of Islam was quickly replaced by negative views in 
the later months and years following 9/11. When asked if “mainstream Islam encourages 
violence against non-Muslims,” the percentage of Americans who agreed more than doubled 
between January 2002 and September 2003 from 14% to 34%, while the proportion who 
believed Islam to be a “peaceful religion” decreased from 57% to 46% over the same time 
period.161 Of course, some of these findings can be attributed to the war in Afghanistan and the 
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American invasion of Iraq by 2003. By associating terrorism with these wars and connecting 
terrorism with Islam, American Islamophobia grew steadily in the years after 9/11. Analyzing 
the trends of several published public opinion polls, Castro Panagopoulos concluded, 
“Americans were more informed about, tolerant of, and sensitive to Muslims and the religion of 
Islam directly after the September 11 attacks. Over time, though, as people became removed 
from the events, the data indicate that Americans appear less informed about and more cautious 
toward Arab and Muslim Americans.”162 Perhaps a result of increased positive rhetoric and 
interest in Islam immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Americans were more knowledgeable and 
accepting of the Muslim religion, but with U.S. invasions of Muslim majority countries and the 
return of wounded and deceased American soldiers in the following years, Americans displayed 
a renewed suspicion and contempt for Islam. 
The contradiction of Islamophobia in the United States did not end with the Bush 
administration in 2008. Careful rhetoric paired with discriminatory policy continued with 
bipartisan consistency throughout the administration of President Obama. Although he took 
office over eight and a half years after 9/11, President Obama’s administration was both a target 
and proponent of Islamophobic sentiment within the U.S. 
Although further removed from the 9/11 terrorist attacks than his predecessor, President 
Obama was placed in a unique position regarding Islam from the onset of his campaign. Just 
before announcing his presidential candidacy in February 2007, Insight Magazine printed an 
article falsely claiming that then-Senator Obama was raised and educated as a Muslim.163 Fox 
News picked up the story, and the rumor quickly spread around the country, following President 
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Obama for the duration of his campaign and subsequent presidency.164 Even after a year and a 
half of repeated denial from both the Obama campaign and fact-checking media outlets, it was 
reported in September 2008 that around one third of likely voters believed Obama was or could 
be Muslim.165 It is unsurprising given the West’s historical suspicion of Islam that these false 
claims painted President Obama as an un-American, unpatriotic candidate. During the 2008 
election, most Americans remained wary of the possibility of a Muslim president, so linking 
President Obama to Islam proved an effective strategy for his opponents. As a result of the 
negative American perception of Muslims, the Obama administration separated itself from the 
Islamic community. Despite these efforts, Time magazine and the Pew Research Center found 
that over a year into President Obama’s first term, 25% of Americans still believed he was 
secretly a Muslim with around half the population doubting his Christianity.166 Perhaps this 
complicated entanglement with Islam compelled President Obama to maintain the Islamophobic 
status quo during his administration.  
Like President Bush, President Obama crafted his speeches carefully and worked to 
include Muslim Americans in the national framework. For instance, just a few months after 
taking office, President Obama stated at the Turkish Parliament, “The United States is not, and 
will never be, at war with Islam.”167 In doing so, he distinguished terrorism from the religion of 
Islam and attempted to restore international relationships with Muslim majority countries. Going 
beyond his predecessor, President Obama renamed the enemy of the U.S. as “violent extremism” 
instead of what President Bush had called “radical Islam” from 2001-2006, separating the two 
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entities even further.168 Looking to isolate al-Qaeda and prevent the terrorist organization from 
using Islam as a recruiting mechanism, President Obama sought support from Muslim 
communities abroad in fighting the War on Terror. Additionally, President Obama paralleled 
President Bush’s speech at the Washington D.C. Islamic Center with similar remarks at the 
Islamic Society of Baltimore in 2016.169 Using the same language as Bush, President Obama 
emphasized Islam’s peaceful foundation saying, “For more than a thousand years, people have 
been drawn to Islam’s message of peace. And the very word itself, Islam, comes from salam – 
peace . . . And like so many faiths, Islam is rooted in a commitment to compassion and mercy 
and justice and charity . . . For Christians like myself, I’m assuming that sounds familiar.”170 In 
this speech, President Obama continued President Bush’s positive language to provide a clearer, 
more favorable image of Islam to the American people. From a rhetorical perspective, President 
Obama continued and expanded President Bush’s outreach to the Islamic world, reinforcing the 
faith’s dedication to peaceful ideals.   
However, President Obama also maintained President Bush’s discriminatory policy 
toward Arab and Muslim Americans during his administration. For example, President Obama 
supported the utilization and extension of the Patriot Act to prevent terrorism.171 His 
administration frequently used the law enforcement tools allowed by controversial sections of the 
Patriot Act like wiretapping without warrants and the seizure of “tangible things” during 
investigations.172 Furthermore, the Director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at George 
Washington University concluded that, “Despite the ranging controversies over civilian trials and 
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Miranda rights for alleged terrorists, the Obama administration has largely worked within the 
Bush administration’s legal framework on a range of issues, including domestic surveillance, 
state secrets, extraordinary rendition and targeted assassination abroad.”173 Likewise, many of 
the previously mentioned Islamophobic FBI training materials were distributed under the Obama 
administration, and law enforcement around the country continued to target Muslim and Middle 
Eastern citizens in the name of counterterrorism throughout his presidency. Ultimately, President 
Obama continued the Bush administration’s disconnect between positive rhetoric and 
Islamophobic policy by maintaining peaceful language while simultaneously extending 
discriminatory legislation. 
Unfortunately, this Islamophobic trend in policy has persisted in the United States and is 
now coupled with hateful governmental rhetoric. Unlike Presidents Bush and Obama who 
masked discriminatory antiterrorism initiatives with inclusive dialogue and public appearances 
with Islamic leaders, President Trump has held a consistent, Islamophobic position for the 
duration of his presidential campaign and four-year term in both rhetoric and policy. 
To understand President Trump’s Islamophobic platform and general appeal, it is 
important to recognize the context in which he was elected. By the start of President Trump’s 
campaign, widespread Islamophobic sentiment in the United States had resurfaced. With the 
instability in the Middle East caused by violent demonstrations during the Arab Spring in 2011, 
the ensuing Syrian refugee crisis, and the rise of ISIS in 2014, a heightened sense of 
apprehension toward Middle Eastern and Muslim people returned within the U.S. and Europe.  
In response to decades of political repression and economic hardship, several countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa revolted against their longstanding authoritative governments, 
 
173 Lynch, Rhetoric and Reality, 14. 
Bilz 48 
 
and many successfully deposed their leaders between January and April of 2011, now called the 
Arab Spring.174 Beginning in December in Tunisia after a vegetable seller set himself on fire in 
protest of government abuse and economic turmoil, the Tunisian people demonstrated in the 
streets until the leading family of Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011.175 
Demanding the permanent removal of Ben Ali and his entire administration, the Tunisian people 
launched the rallying cry of the Arab Spring, “The people want the fall of the regime.”176 Within 
the following months, the leaders of Egypt, Libya, and Yemen had been deposed or killed, and 
large-scale protests were sustained throughout the Middle East and North Africa, specifically in 
Bahrain, Morocco, and Iraq.177 Furthermore, emboldened protestors in Syria were met with 
violence from Bashar al-Assad’s regime in March 2011, instigating a brutal civil war that has 
displaced millions of Syrian people from 2011 through today as the fighting continues.178 By 
April 2016, 11.5% of Syria’s population had been killed or injured, and 4.8 million Syrians were 
living as refugees outside the country with 6.6 million others displaced internally.179 This 
regional instability alarmed the U.S. and Europe as several Islamist groups that were perceived to 
have terrorist sympathies, including the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), vied for power 
in the Middle East, specifically in Syria.180  
 Having captured significant territory in Iraq and pushing into Syria, the militant Islamist 
extremist group ISIS rose to prominence in 2014 through an alliance with al-Qaeda.181 In the 
summer of 2014, President Obama launched airstrikes against ISIS, who retaliated by beheading 
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Western hostages.182 The group gained traction internationally through online recruiting, 
capitalizing on “self-radicalization” in the West with “homegrown” terror attacks in Germany, 
the UK, and France.183 By 2016, ISIS had “either inspired or directed attacks in 11 Western 
countries.”184 At the same time, Americans and Europeans became fearful of ISIS members 
hiding among Syrian refugees and being allowed entry abroad. With a renewed fear of Islamic 
extremism and terrorism in the U.S., suspicion of Muslims mounted in the U.S. and Europe.    
Therefore, President Trump capitalized on already-present Islamophobic sentiment in the 
U.S. by campaigning on tighter immigration restrictions in the name of national security and 
invoking misplaced fear and distrust in the nation’s Muslim and Middle Eastern communities. 
Once elected, President Trump instituted some of the most blatantly discriminatory policy since 
the Civil Rights Movement. 
During his presidential campaign beginning in 2015, President Trump disseminated 
hateful and baseless rhetoric against Islam at campaign rallies, in media interviews, and on 
Twitter, relying on America’s historic distrust of Muslims and exploiting the fear and grief still 
felt from the 9/11 attacks. For example, at a rally held in Birmingham, Alabama in November 
2015, President Trump claimed that he personally witnessed “thousands” of Muslims celebrating 
in New Jersey on 9/11.185 Although not verified by any media sources or videos taken on 
September 11, President Trump stood by his claims on ABC’s “This Week,” saying “There were 
people that were cheering on the other side of New Jersey, where you have large Arab 
populations. They were cheering as the World Trade Center came down. I know it might not be 
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politically correct for you to talk about it, but there were people cheering as that building came 
down – as those buildings came down. And that tells you something.”186 Even though this 
statement was widely disputed by New Jersey police and local government officials, President 
Trump reiterated this harmful lie on Twitter, linking a video to “credible sources” allegedly 
showing Muslims celebrating on 9/11.187 These statements and subsequent tweets not only 
spread false information to the American public but also led to more needless suspicion of 
peaceful Muslims in the United States while contributing to the idea of mutual exclusivity 
between the Islamic belief system and American ideals. Furthermore, President Trump 
diametrically opposed President Bush’s rhetorical approach after 9/11. While President Trump 
disseminated fear and distrust by claiming widespread Arab celebrations fourteen years after the 
attacks, President Bush dispelled this idea immediately following 9/11 in his “Islam is Peace” 
speech, saying “Like the good folks standing with me, the American people were appalled and 
outraged at last Tuesday’s attacks. And so were Muslims all across the world. Both Americans 
and Muslim friends and citizens, tax-paying citizens, and Muslims in nations were just appalled 
and could not believe what we saw on our TV screens.”188 Despite President Bush and Islamic 
leaders’ assurances of Muslim loyalty to the United States, President Trump reignited suspicion 
and mistrust of Islam with his continued baseless accusations against Muslims following 9/11. 
Besides exploiting the grief and heightened sensitivity surrounding 9/11, President 
Trump employed hateful, Islamophobic rhetoric throughout the campaign trail. For example, he 
issued the following statement on December 7, 2015: “Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and 
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can 
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figure out what is going on.”189 This position encourages the illegal use of religious profiling in 
immigration policy and wrongfully blames all Muslims for the actions of extremist terrorists. 
Later, when asked if Islam was at war with the West on CNN in March 2016, President Trump 
replied, “I think Islam hates us . . . there’s a tremendous hatred there. We have to get to the 
bottom of it. There’s an unbelievable hatred of us.”190 When pressed on if it was a war with 
radical Islam or Islam itself, Mr. Trump answered, “It’s radical, but it’s very hard to define. It’s 
very hard to separate because you don’t know who’s who.”191 Feeding into the Huntington and 
Lewis “clash of civilizations” narrative, President Trump unequivocally stated that the religion 
of Islam “hates” the United States. Again, this statement is a stark contrast to President Bush’s 
speech in which he referred to the Muslim leaders at the Islamic Center of Washington D.C. 
saying, “They love America just as much as I do.”192 Again, President Trump cast suspicion on 
the entire religion of Islam when discussing suicide bombings in Brussels stating, “We’re having 
problems with the Muslims, and we’re having problems with the Muslims coming into the 
country . . . This all happened because, frankly, there’s no assimilation. They are not assimilating 
. . . They want to go by sharia law. They want sharia law. They don’t want the laws that we have. 
They want sharia law.”193 Wildly generalizing about a diverse community of people, President 
Trump placed a target on Muslims across the country. Unlike the continued efforts of Presidents 
Bush and Obama, President Trump made no attempt to separate peaceful Muslims from 
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extremist terrorists in his statements during his presidential campaign, further perpetuating the 
myth that Islam is incompatible with the United States. 
Specifically, President Trump’s quote on Muslims wanting sharia law represents a 
broader theme of Western fixation on and misunderstanding of the Islamic legal code. 
Describing the contention surrounding sharia law as a “modern phenomenon,” legal scholars 
emphasize the connection between Islamic law and English common law saying, “Even within 
the scholarly community, there is still too little understanding of, or interest in, the Islamic legal 
tradition. Thus, few are aware of the extent to which the English common law borrowed from the 
Islamic legal tradition, the impact of Europe’s encounter with Islamic law on the development of 
international law, or the prominent role of Islamic law in global finance and commerce, both 
historically and in the present.”194 Additionally, Islamic law is founded on pluralism and rooted 
in the different Islamic schools of thought interpreting the Quran and Sunnah.195 In fact, Islamic 
tradition links sharia with “God’s way” and fiqh as the different interpretations of sharia.196 
Although not always practiced historically, the Islamic community valued and encouraged 
diverse understandings of religious law.197 Thus, even though there is no consensus among the 
global Muslim community on the correct interpretation or structure of sharia law nor a 
unanimous desire among Muslims for it to become adopted into public law, many Americans 
view sharia law as a great threat to the U.S. Constitution. For example, since 2010, seventy-eight 
anti-Muslim bills or constitutional amendments have been introduced in thirty-one states and 
U.S. Congress with the intent to prohibit the adoption of sharia law.198 A Tennessee bill from 
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March 2011 states, “knowing adherence to sharia . . . is prima facie evidence of an act in support 
of the overthrow of the United States government.”199 Even though most Muslims in the United 
States do not favor sharia law and no major groups advocate for its adoption in the U.S., thirty-
one states believe that it is an imminent threat to public policy.200 Most of the bills have been 
struck down or revised so as to not obviously target Muslim populations, but they represent the 
continued American mistrust and suspicion of Muslims as well as the fundamental 
misunderstanding of Muslim beliefs and practices.201 
Moreover, President Trump praised Mayor Giuliani for his surveillance of mosques and 
inaccurately criticized Mayor Bloomberg for allegedly ending the NYPD’s discriminatory 
counterterrorism protocol, encouraging renewed suspicion of the Islamic religion within the 
United States.202 When asked how he would protect U.S. citizens from ISIS, President Trump 
ignored the rights of millions of Muslim citizens and responded, “You’re going to have to watch 
and study the mosques because a lot of talk is going on at the mosques. And from what I’ve 
heard in the old days, meaning a while ago, we had great surveillance going on in and around 
mosques in New York City, and I understand our mayor totally cut that out.”203 While he 
incorrectly stated that Mayor Bloomberg ended mosque surveillance when it persisted under his 
tenure, President Trump issued his support for spying on Muslim places of worship. In the same 
interview, when told that French leadership was discussing shutting down mosques with radical 
teachings, President Trump answered, “I would hate to do it, but it’s something that you’re 
gonna [sic] have to strongly consider. Because some of the ideas and some of the hatred, the 
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absolute hatred, is coming from these areas.”204 Similarly, when asked about the U.K.’s policy of 
closing mosques, President Trump praised the idea saying, “I would do that, absolutely. I think 
it’s great.”205 In threatening to deny Muslim Americans their right to practice religion, President 
Trump outwardly agreed with the Islamophobic policy Mayors Giuliani and Bloomberg 
intentionally kept hidden from the American public. Unlike his governmental predecessors, 
President Trump did not mask his Islamophobic views but instead campaigned on promises of 
religious and racial profiling. 
While making prejudiced assertions about Islam’s relationship to ISIS and mosques 
breeding hatred within the U.S., President Trump neglected to look at data. According to Pew 
Research Center in 2017, the global view of ISIS among Muslims is generally unfavorable, even 
“overwhelmingly negative.”206 In addition, most Muslims said that “suicide bombings and other 
forms of violence against civilians in the name of Islam are rarely or never justified” with 91% 
agreement in Iraq, where ISIS was founded.207 As for the claim that all Muslims want sharia law, 
Pew found different results, with countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan favoring sharia 
law while others like Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan disagreed.208 Despite the diversity in 
beliefs of Muslims globally and the broad disapproval of ISIS, President Trump continued to 
associate all Muslims with extremist terrorists. 
Sadly, President Trump’s harmful view of Muslims carried into his presidential rhetoric, 
particularly on Twitter. For instance, while in office in November 2017, the president retweeted 
videos captioned “Muslim Destroys a Statue of Virgin Mary” and “Muslim migrant beats up 
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Dutch boy on crutches!”209 He later deleted them, but the message of Islamophobia remained 
clear with the videos suggesting a stereotypical predisposition to violence in Muslims and a 
rejection of Western Christian beliefs. Later, on March 23, 2019 in a targeted attack on 
Representative Ilhan Omar of Minnesota, a Somali Muslim immigrant, President Trump tweeted 
a video of the World Trade Center burning with Omar saying “some people did something” in 
reference to the attacks.210 Representative Omar’s remarks from the video were said at CAIR and 
taken out of context. She was speaking on discrimination against Muslims after 9/11, and, unlike 
the president, she was deliberate in not associating Islam with terrorism.211 By linking Omar, one 
of just two Muslim representatives in the House at the time, with the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, President Trump reinforced a negative view of Muslim citizens. Again, President 
Trump singled out Representative Omar because of her faith in a July 14, 2019 tweet: 
So interesting to see ‘Progressive’ Democrat Congresswomen, who originally came from 
countries whose governments are a complete and total catastrophe, the worst, most 
corrupt and inept anywhere in the world (if they even have a functioning government at 
all), now loudly and viciously telling the people of the United States, the greatest and 
most powerful Nation on earth, how our government is to be run. Why don’t they go back 
and help fix the totally broken and crime infested places from which they came. Then 
come back and show us how it is done. These places need your help badly, you can’t 
leave fast enough.212 
At a subsequent rally, President Trump’s supporters chanted, “Send her back!”213 thus 
encouraging racist and Islamophobic rhetoric among Americans. According to Political Science 
scholars:  
Donald Trump’s hate speech and demonization of non-Whites, mainstream media, and 
oppositional politicians, and his implicit and explicit praise of violence resulted in many 
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verbal and corporal attacks against members of the denigrated groups . . . Trump stirred 
fear, hate, and anger among his core supporters by warning them of dangerous ‘others’ 
threatening ‘America as we know it’ in terms of history, culture, values, and racial 
dominance. Whether by dog whistle or bullhorn, he spread online and off-line a divisive 
propaganda that in many respects resembled right-extremists’ ideology and glorification 
of violence.214 
Although not limited to Muslim and Middle Eastern citizens, President Trump’s negative and 
racist rhetoric influenced the rest of the country by using the historical us versus them framework 
reinforcing the American view of Muslims as outsiders. 
 In addition to President Trump’s hateful language and implications regarding Muslims, 
he instituted Islamophobic policies more blatantly than his predecessors Presidents Bush and 
Obama. Most notably, within his first week in office, President Trump signed an executive order 
prohibiting immigrants from Muslim majority countries from entering the United States.215 The 
order banned all immigrants and nonimmigrants from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, 
and Yemen as well as all Syrian refugees.216 The only exception to these rules was listed as 
“when the person is a religious minority in his country of nationality facing religious 
persecution.”217 This stipulation which would grant access to religious minorities in Muslim 
majority countries allowed for the entrance of specifically Christian refugees and prevented 
exclusively Muslims from entering the United States. Two days after President Trump signed the 
order, former Mayor and Presidential advisor Rudy Giuliani spoke about drafting the legislation 
on Fox News. When asked if the ban was related to religion, Giuliani explained, “When 
[President Trump] first announced it, he said, ‘Muslim ban.’ He called me up, he said, ‘Put a 
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commission together. Show me the right way to do it legally’ . . . We focused on, instead of 
religion, danger. Areas of the world that create danger for us, which is a factual basis, not a 
religious basis.”218 Here, Giuliani showed President Trump’s true intention with the executive 
order, to ban Muslim immigrants from entering the country in an explicit example of religious 
discrimination from the nation’s highest office.  
 In analyzing this ban on refugees, Margaret Hodson discussed the Islamophobic 
motivation and implications of ignoring a largely bipartisan approach to U.S. refugee policy.219 
Outlining the beliefs of various anti-refugee organizations, she argued against the 
mischaracterized Muslim belief in hijra, or migration, as a political and social tactic to infiltrate 
Western societies specifically to implement sharia law.220 Furthermore, she stated that, like the 
President, these groups falsely claim that refugees have committed terrible crimes against the 
U.S. but the media fails to report them and the government does not screen them, leaving the 
opportunity for terrorists to enter the country.221 She concluded: 
Overall, both the Center for Security Policy and ACT for America use traditional 
Islamophobic fears about civilization jihad and terrorism as their justifications for 
opposing the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. In their view, Muslim refugees 
resettling in the United States are undertaking a “hijra”—jihad via migration—in order to 
undermine the Constitution and/or commit acts of terrorism that will ultimately destroy 
Western civilizational and lead to the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in America 
with Sharia law. This warped understanding of hijra not only ignores the historical record 
regarding Muhammad’s journey from Mecca to Medina, but also overlooks the larger 
theological significance of the hijra as a peaceful spiritual journey to connect with 
God.222 
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These ideas can be directly linked as President Trump’s motivation to enact the Muslim ban and 
represent the national Islamophobic fears of terrorism, sharia law, and “civilizational jihad” 
through Muslim refugees.223 In fact, President Trump connected himself with the Center for 
Security Policy saying they were “a very highly respected group of people who I know, 
actually.”224 With the President of the United States aligning himself with an extreme, 
discredited organization, going so far as to cite their widely disputed statistics on American 
Muslim views, President Trump gave credit to these Islamophobic ideas and lent himself to the 
passing of unfounded, discriminatory policy. 
This transition from President Bush’s peaceful rhetoric to President Trump’s hate-
inspiring speech greatly impacted the American public. In 2016, the year President Trump was 
elected and ISIS emerged as an international terrorist threat, more assaults against Muslims were 
reported than within the aftermath of 9/11.225 Islamophobic hate crimes rose overall by 19% 
from 2015 to 2016 after a dramatic increase of 67% from 2014 to 2015.226 For example, the 
Louisville Islamic Center was vandalized on September 16, 2015 with phrases like “Nazis speak 
Arabic” and “Moslems – leave the Jews alone” spray painted in red.227 With rhetoric and policy 
as hateful as President Trump’s combined with the perceived threat to national security, it is 
unsurprising that the American public has reverted back to the alarming levels of discrimination 
recorded immediately after 9/11 nearly twenty years ago. Moreover, in 2017, half of American 
adults believed “Islam is not a part of mainstream American society,” and 44% reported “a 
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natural conflict between Islam and democracy.”228 Pew Research Center also found that 
President Trump worried 68% of Muslim respondents in the U.S. and that 75% reported “a lot” 
of Islamophobic discrimination with 48% experiencing at least one incident of discrimination 
within the year.229 Furthermore, President Trump’s fearful attitude toward Muslims and his 
mounting concerns with ISIS reintroduced the clash of civilizations political framework.230 
Unfortunately, these statistics, attitudes, and renewed interest in the monolithic clash of the West 
with Islam show a continued distrust and prejudice against Muslims, Arabs, and those perceived 
to be in either group. 
While critics of President Bush have often pointed out his flawed approach to the War on 
Terror specifically citing the invasion of Iraq in 2003, most scholars and political pundits 
acknowledge that his policies were in immediate response to one of the greatest threats to 
national security the United States had ever seen. Although many were hurtful and impacted 
innocent civilians, President Bush’s reactionary Islamophobic policies came from a place of real 
fear and imminent danger. The same cannot be said of President Trump’s rhetoric and policy 
fifteen years after the attacks. Although ISIS was emerging as a terrorist threat abroad at the 
same time as the Syrian refugee crisis, there were few isolated incidents in the U.S. that had any 
real connection to the extremist group. Therefore, it is clear that President Trump’s Islamophobia 
was rooted in gross misunderstanding and racism, not the fear he renewed in the hearts and 
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 The days following September 11, 2001 were marked with patriotic symbols, 
compassionate gestures, and a heightened sense of fear within the American people. This fear 
reawakened and emboldened the historic Western suspicion of Islam and those who practice its 
tenets. Huntington and Lewis’s predicted “clash of civilizations” had supposedly come to 
fruition, and the American people grew wary of Islam.231 As a result, Islamophobic hate crimes 
skyrocketed, and the persecution of American Muslims began. 
 The months following September 11, 2001 were marked by peaceful rhetoric from 
President Bush and Mayor Giuliani, a commitment to end racial profiling by Attorney General 
Ashcroft and the FBI,232 and the implementation of decades long policy of religiously and 
racially motivated surveillance of members of the Middle Eastern and Islamic community in the 
name of national security. Although government officials were careful to distinguish between 
Islam and terrorism, the law enforcement initiatives they oversaw allowed for the widespread 
monitoring of Muslim neighborhoods, mosques, and immigrants from Muslim majority 
countries.233 Although hate crime statistics fell, American views of Islam became less favorable 
and more suspicious within the first few years after 9/11.234 
 The decades following September 11, 2001 were marked by foreign wars in Muslim 
majority countries, terrorist attacks in the U.S. and Europe by Islamic extremist groups, and a 
U.S. president with complementary rhetoric and policy against Muslim citizens and immigrants. 
By 2016, Islamophobic hate crimes were reported at levels only reached in the days immediately 
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after the 9/11 attacks.235 With President Trump exploiting the historic fear and suspicion of 
Muslims in the United States, the country has continued to engage in blatant religious 
discrimination. 
 While President Bush believed that the response to the 9/11 attacks showed the “best of 
America,”236 9/11 also brought out the worst of the country, manifesting itself in the systemic 
fear, distrust, and discrimination of American Muslim citizens. Rooted in a faulty understanding 
of the Middle East and Islamic belief system, U.S. officials targeted the Muslim community in 
their counterterrorism policies while the American public harassed, vandalized, assaulted, and 
even killed innocent Muslim civilians. Thinly disguised by positive rhetoric, both local and 
federal leaders approved and implemented mass discrimination against Muslim and Middle 
Eastern communities.  
 Blinded by overwhelming grief and fear, many Americans were willing to sacrifice their 
own personal freedom for safety in the wake of 9/11. Ever since this tragic day, government 
leaders have struggled to balance national security concerns with civil rights violations, 
specifically pertaining to Muslim and Middle Eastern Americans. With the passing of the Patriot 
Act and the implementation of national counterterrorism policies under the FBI and local police 
forces, Americans everywhere faced the possibility of surveillance, demographic mapping, and 
detention with minimal cause. However, most Americans did not truly face the repercussions of 
these policies. Instead, the unintended consequence of these counterterrorism measures has been 
the mass discrimination and targeting of Muslim and Middle Eastern people as well as those 
perceived to be in either group at the hands of the American public as well as law enforcement 
officials. Ultimately, the United States sacrificed the personal freedom and safety of its Muslim 
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people in the name of national security after 9/11. Now, twenty-one years later, Muslim 
Americans face less of a contradiction within the policy and rhetoric of the American 
government but continue to suffer the widespread and consistent burden of Islamophobic 
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